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Abstract
Much of everyday life in cities is now mediated by digital platforms, a mode of organization in which control is both
distributed widely among participants and sharply delimited by the platform’s constraints. This article uses examples of
smartphone-based platforms for urbanmobility to argue that platforms create new political arrangements of the city, inter-
mediating the social processes of management and movement that characterize urban life. Its empirical basis is a study
of user interfaces, data specifications, and algorithms used in the operation and regulation of ride-hailing services and
bike-share systems. I focus on three aspects of urban politics affected by platforms: its location, its participants, and the
types of conflict it addresses. First, the programming forums in which decisions are encoded in and distributed through
platforms’ core digital architecture are new sites of policy deliberation outside the more familiar arenas of city politics.
Second, travelers have new opportunities to use platforms for travel on their own terms, but this expanded participation
is circumscribed by interfaces that presuppose individual, transactional engagement rather than a participation attentive
to a broader social and environmental context. Finally, digital systems show themselves to be well suited to enforcing
quantifiable distributional goals, but struggle to resolve the more nuanced relational matters that constitute the politics
of everyday city life. These illustrations suggest that digital tools for managing transportation are not only political prod-
ucts, but also reset the stage on which urban encounters play out.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, a smartphone in your pocket has for
many become every bit as indispensable for getting
around the city as car keys or a transit pass. Mobile
apps provide information on the fastest driving routes
through current traffic or the estimated arrival time of
the next bus. They hail drivers of Ubers, and they unlock
shared bicycles and scooters. Behind much of this new
digital mediation of urban mobility is the platform, an
arrangement that both facilitates and bounds social inter-
action. Digital platforms, fueled by big data and accelerat-
ed by the automatic operations of algorithms, have come
to dominate the Internet (Helmond, 2015). With the
proliferation of ‘sharing economy’ platforms like Uber
and Airbnb, the platform’s reach has become apparent
beyond the computer screen and in the city, a move
charted by the emerging literature on ‘platform urban-
ism’ (Barns, 2020; Leszczynski, 2019a; Rodgers & Moore,
2018). While these platforms have clearly become more
present in our everyday lives online and in the city, what
is sometimes less apparent is what they do differently
than the systems they supplant. Is Uber simply a more
convenient taxi? Or does it represent a qualitative trans-
formation in how we engage with the city?
This article answers by examining the political dimen-
sions of platform interventions in urban mobility. It uses
two inherent and seemingly contradictory qualities of
the platform—the centralized control exerted by its
core structure and its openness to modification by
its participants—to argue that mobility platforms are
not neutral technical solutions applied to simple trans-
portation problems, but are instead active players in
shaping the engagements of urban inhabitants with
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each other and their city. The platforms, in short, are
political (Andersson Schwarz, 2017; Butt, McQuire, &
Papastergiadis, 2016; Plantin, 2015), and the focus here
is on politics in a particular sense. Following a generation
of scholarship in science and technology studies, recent
studies of platforms have looked at the consequences
of platform politics—for example, the ways in which
“digitality (re)produces power and extant sociospatial
inequalities along lines of race, gender, class, sexuali-
ty, age, ability and more” (Elwood & Leszczynski, 2018,
p. 630). At the same time, technologies are also prod-
ucts of socially situated human values, an argument at
the heart of science and technology studies literature
(Bijker, Hughes, & Pinch, 1987; MacKenzie & Wajcman,
1985) that applies equally to platforms.Work in the polit-
ical economy vein, for example, has critically examined
platforms as tools of value production and accumula-
tion reflecting the capitalist paradigm of their creators
(Langley & Leyshon, 2017; Srnicek, 2017). In this article,
however, I position the platform not just as a product or
producer of politics, but as the very site in which politi-
cal engagement happens. Platforms have “politics” in the
sense that Chantal Mouffe describes as an “ensemble of
practices, discourses and institutions that seek to estab-
lish a certain order and to organize human coexistence”
(1999, p. 754), a framing of power-laden resolution and
exclusion that Crawford (2016) has successfully applied
to the workings of software. The participatory nature of
platforms, which are extended and modified by actors
pursing disparate agendas, highlights this political func-
tion in ways that other sociotechnical systems do not.
In this light, this article’s contribution is to illustrate the
politics of platforms by examining the ways that urban
mobility platforms establish new arenas of deliberation,
specify the kind of participant who is imagined to engage
in the platform, and identify the type of disputes that can
be resolved.
The empirical demonstration of this digitally mediat-
ed politics is a qualitative study of urban mobility plat-
forms focusing on smartphone apps and supporting soft-
ware for ride-hailing and bike share. The examples are
of a data specification, a user interface, and an algorith-
mic approach to policy enforcement. Each of these three
addresses a familiar concern for municipal regulators:
traveler privacy, the use of single-occupancy vehicles,
and bicycle parking in the public right-of-way, respec-
tively. The application of platforms to these concerns,
however, demonstrates the political dimensions of the
platform’s intermediation. In these examples, the plat-
form transfers multiple local policy positions into a sin-
gle standards-based design that then shapes subsequent
use indiscriminately. It provides room for participants to
exercise their own agency in their travel, but favors a par-
ticipation that is individualistic and transactional. And it
offers algorithmic resolutions to conflicts that are easily
monitored and quantified, but struggles to mediate the
messy everyday relations of people sharing space in the
city. In each of these, the inherent qualities of digital plat-
forms, as applied to urban mobility, shape subsequent
modes of engagement among people in the city. Before
presenting these cases, the following section discusses
these qualities in a brief introduction to theorizations of
platforms and platform urbanism.
2. Platforms as Participatory Infrastructures
The concept of the ‘platform’ has been used in Internet
studies to describe the simultaneous expansion of user-
generated content and concentration of control in
a handful of companies. In a paradigmatic example,
Facebook is characterized by users freely posting and
interacting in ways that Facebook does not direct. At the
same time, this participation is structured andmonitored
by Facebook’s technical and institutional architectures,
and it generates value that accrues to Facebook the cor-
poration. As a platform, then, Facebook both decentral-
izes production and centralizes control of Internet con-
tent (Helmond, 2015). These seemingly contradictory
tendencies, towards heterogeneous and expanded par-
ticipation on the one hand and standardization and cen-
tralized control on the other, is the essential paradox of
platforms (Ananny&Gillespie, 2016; Andersson Schwarz,
2017). Van Dijck, Poell, and de Waal (2018) define a plat-
form as “a programmable digital architecture designed
to organize interactions between users” (p. 4), and most
definitions share these two essential elements: a core
architecture or framework that is built and controlled
centrally, and the participation of users in contributing
to or interacting within its organization.
No single definition captures the many kinds of sys-
tems referred to as platforms in practice, and the term
itself slides easily between technical, political, economic,
and social definitions (Gillespie, 2010). Online, platforms
describe social media, the sharing economy, and online
marketplaces. In stricter technical definitions, platforms
are not simply tweets or Uber rides, but are character-
ized by their programmability. Platforms like Microsoft
Windows prescribe the software standards by which
third parties develop new applications that operate on
the platform, extending the platform’s utility beyond the
designs of its creators (Mackenzie, 2018; Plantin, Lagoze,
Edwards, & Sandvig, 2018). More social perspectives see
platforms as modes of interpersonal connectivity and
templates for organizational management (Kelkar, 2018;
van Dijck et al., 2018), while economic views character-
ize them as multi-sided markets facilitating connections
between buyers and sellers. Their emphases differ, but
these perspectives share an attention to platforms’ bring-
ing together of technical structures and social exchange.
Cities similarly comprise both built infrastructures
and interpersonal relations, and recent work in ‘platform
urbanism’ has articulated analytically fertile resonances
between platforms and cities. Geographers have long
insisted that the screen-based practices of the Internet
are not merely ‘virtual’ phenomena somehow divorced
from physical places, but instead are practices that occur
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in and through already existing social and spatial con-
texts (Ash, Kitchin, & Leszczynski, 2018; Graham, 2005;
Kitchin & Dodge, 2011; Thrift & French, 2002). In this
vein, the emerging platform urbanism scholarship has
taken theorizations of platforms developed mostly in
media studies and drawn out their geographical and
urban dimensions. By paying attention to the ways that
platforms are actually lived out in everyday practices
of, for example, labor (Richardson, 2020) and mobility
(van der Graaf & Ballon, 2019), this work on the “emer-
gent, irreducible, co-generative dynamics between plat-
forms and the urban” (Rodgers & Moore, 2018) illumi-
nates how the city has becomea site for “the re-encoding
or remediation of urban socio-spatial relationships into
territories for platform intermediation” (Barns, 2019,
emphasis in the original). Like platform studies more
broadly, the emerging literature on platforms is multi-
faceted. Here I take two themes of platform urbanism as
points of departure: infrastructure and participation.
First, an understanding of platforms requires engage-
ment with theories of material infrastructures and their
politics, argue Plantin et al. (2018). Increasingly, they
say, digital platforms are taking on qualities of infras-
tructure by becoming ubiquitous, essential, and taken-
for-granted (Star, 1999). At the same time, they see a
“platformization of infrastructure” in the ways that pub-
lic infrastructures like roadways that were once deliv-
ered according to an ideal of universal service provision
are increasingly managedwith differential access accord-
ing to a neoliberal logic of individualization and profit
(Graham & Marvin, 2001). In cities, the platform oper-
ates somewhat differently than infrastructure in that it
reorganizes cities “not through new physical infrastruc-
tures, but instead through novel technologies of coordi-
nation” applied to existing infrastructures (Richardson,
2020, p. 460). The city’s transit systems, sewer lines, and
parks have been recognized as products of specific social
values and power relations that then continue to shape
cities through their material endurance (McFarlane &
Rutherford, 2008; Winner, 1980). As city transportation
departments who once delivered buses and bike share
systems now, in addition or instead, provide transit data
and permit third-party sharedmobility vendors, platform
urbanism offers a path for studying the power of the plat-
form’s central architecture through the lens of infrastruc-
tural politics.
Second, the platform’s emphasis on the participation
of its users leads platform urbanism to a focus on the
city’s people, not just its software systems. Antecedent
studies and critiques of the smart city, which general-
ly address large-scale deployments of digital technolo-
gies in the monitoring and control of urban systems,
often employ a political-economic analytic of capitalism,
neoliberalism, or technocracy aimed at the scale of a sys-
tem or an organization. Leszczynski (2019a) has faulted
these accounts for advancing “totalizing” narratives of
capitalist domination that occlude any other analytical
frames, particularly the actually lived experiences of peo-
ple exercising their own agency in and through urban sys-
tems (see also Rose, 2017), and she cautions the study of
platforms against taking the same path. The potential of
platform urbanism, Leszczynski argues, is in offering “a
more hopeful platform urban politics by extending and
recognizing ordinary urban denizens’ abilities to express
political capacity through everyday digital interactions
and practices” (Leszczynski, 2019a, p. 13). The partici-
pation and programmability inherent to platforms mean
that we cannot understand a platform by studying only
the system structure itself; we must also look to what
people actually do with the platform (Fields, Bissell, &
Macrorie, 2020; Leszczynski, 2019b). If, as Sarah Barns
says, platforms are “highly participatory ecosystems of
interaction” that “engender and reshape everyday selves
and spaces in vital ways” (2019, p. 2), then the sociality
of the city offers critical sites for examining the politics of
platform participation.
Before turning to one such site, a final observation
concerns the place of platforms in urban planning lit-
erature. Planners’ attention to platforms to date has
seen them primarily as disruptions to established regu-
latory regimes. Airbnb and Uber, in the most prominent
examples, have sidestepped local governments’ tradi-
tional controls of land use and transportation. Planners,
in response, have sought to identify the public inter-
est being served or impeded by these corporate plat-
forms, then devised new regulatory approaches applica-
ble to these technologies that will protect these interests
(e.g., Gurran & Phibbs, 2017; Kim et al., 2019). Broadly
speaking, this approach sees platforms as simply a dif-
ferent kind of infrastructure, a system to be managed
such that benefits are distributed equitably and nega-
tive externalities are minimized. In contrast, the perspec-
tives discussed above emphasize how the participatory
qualities of platforms differentiate them from infrastruc-
tures, despite similarities in their material power. Rather
than being objects of an external political deliberation,
platforms are in important ways sites of politics them-
selves. A provider-regulator framing therefore risks over-
simplifying the task of managing platforms by downplay-
ing the ways that their inherent extensibility by users will
always frustrate efforts at control, even by their creators.
This “slipperiness” (Fields et al., 2020) or “ephemerali-
ty” (Graham, 2020) of platforms means that despite the
influence of their core structure, there is often no single
point of intervention throughwhich to protect any identi-
fied public interest. Their political dimensions are there-
fore more extensive and more complex. The following
examples seek to provide a more nuanced understand-
ing of these qualities.
3. Case Illustrations: App-Based Urban Mobility
The remainder of this article takes these infrastruc-
tural and participatory aspects of platform urbanism
as lenses for thinking through the political dimensions
of app-based urban mobility. I use three examples of
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mobility platforms—a data specification (the General
Bikeshare Feed Specification, henceforth GBFS), a user
interface (on Lyft’s app for ride-hailing), and algorith-
mic tools for monitoring and enforcing regulatory com-
pliance (for parking of Lime’s shared bikes and scooters).
Platforms are characterized in part by their capacity to
bring together different categories of participants purs-
ing different types of goals. Each of the following cases
was therefore selected for its illustration of a particular
kind of mobility platform actor: the software develop-
er shipping a product, the end-user making a trip, and
the vendor ensuring regulatory compliance, respective-
ly. Furthermore, these three examples demonstrate how
platformqualities appear at different technical and politi-
cal scales. The organizations and software in these exam-
ples have international scope, but my investigation fre-
quently grounds them in the specific experiences of a sin-
gle city, Seattle. This city is used primarily to illustrate the
interactions of platforms with a given regulatory environ-
ment, and so the particular demographic characteristics
of the city are not directly relevant to the discussion.
The cases presented emerged from a larger research
project investigating the nature of the public produced
by digitally mediated urban mobility. Data was collected
with a variety of qualitative methods. First, I reviewed
public documents and testimony surrounding the City of
Seattle’s permitting of free-floating bike share vendors.
In the summer of 2017, Seattle became the first North
American city to host such a ‘dockless’ bike-share system.
In August of 2018, at the completion of its initial one-
year pilot, the city developed a new permitting structure
(Seattle Department of Transportation, 2018), a process
paralleling that of many other cities creating compara-
ble regulations at the same time. The public discussions
about the appropriate place for this emerging form of
mobility in Seattle generated fruitful data on the policy
response to a new and largely untestedmobility platform.
I supplemented this Seattle perspective with atten-
dance at two national industry conferences and
by monitoring vendor news related to ride-hailing
and free-floating bike and scooter share systems.
Additionally, I followed the development of two open-
source software projects related to mobility data, the
Mobility Data Specification (MDS) and GBFS, on GitHub,
a popular code repository. Their histories differ, but each
is in a relatively early stage of development that is well-
suited to an analysis of the process by which values and
politics become incorporated into software. With this
data from conferences, industry news, and code, I was
specifically attentive to the ways that technical capaci-
ties of these systems shape the means by which various
actors negotiate their intersecting agendas.
Finally, insight into the user experience of platform-
mediated urban mobility was provided by 18 semi-
structured interviews and three focus groups with
Seattle-based end-users of mobility apps. To contrast dif-
ferent types of users, subjects were selected from two
populations: young tech-savvy professionals and the res-
idents of independent-living senior centers. In these dis-
cussions, I asked subjects how apps for hailing rides or
accessing shared vehicles either restricted or expanded
their abilities to meet their mobility needs.
There are limitations to the generalizability of these
cases, which are products of their particular circum-
stances, and the specific politics of platforms will surely
vary with different technical infrastructures or different
participants. Still, these examples are instances of pat-
terns that are expected to repeat, with variations, across
other mobility platforms and in other places. In particu-
lar, the paradoxical coexistence of participation that is
both restricted and expanded, an idea emerging from
media studies research discussed above, is persistent
across these examples. These cases illustrate this general
tendency without claiming to represent the precise ways
the politics will play out elsewhere. Ongoing scholarship
in platformurbanism suggests that there ismuchwork to
be done to continue to trace the contours of these phe-
nomena across cultural and technical contexts.
3.1. Infrastructure: Data Specifications as a Political Site
Data specifications, which govern the exchange of infor-
mation over application programming interfaces (APIs)
by defining a standard format for digital information, are
at the core of platform architecture. Standards are of
course not unique to APIs or platforms, and have been
shown inmany other contexts to exert power over behav-
ior and relations (Busch, 2011; Galloway, 2004). Within
platforms, APIs are the means by which heterogeneous
external elements are brought into the scope of control
of the platform (Bucher, 2013; Helmond, 2015). In the
field of urban mobility, a handful of key data specifica-
tions underlie the APIs through which mobility service
providers, municipalities, and users communicate. This
illustration focuses on one such specification, GBFS.
Likemost cities with bike sharing systems, the Seattle
Department of Transportation (2018) requires bike share
operators to produce APIs conforming to GBFS. This
standard specifies, through a set of JSON schema, how
the location of bikes currently available to rent is com-
municated from mobility vendors to third-party apps.
Travelers using these apps can then find the nearest avail-
able bike at themoment. Seattle also requires data using
a related standard,MDS, which provides a historical view
of trips, including origins, destinations, and routes, with-
in a given time frame to aid transportation officials in
monitoring vendor performance and planning infrastruc-
ture improvements.While GBFS data is publicly available
and is ultimately intended for use by travelers, MDS data
is available only to regulators, in part because it contains
sensitive information about individual trips.
Both specifications have developed as open-source
projects with all code and documentation publicly avail-
able on GitHub (North American Bikeshare Association,
2020; Open Mobility Foundation, 2020). Besides being
transparent, these projects are also ostensibly open to
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contributions from anyone. While the open-source soft-
ware movement reflects a belief in the benefits of more
accessible and egalitarian participation in software devel-
opment, research into these communities over the past
two decades has shown how the persistence of social
and technical barriers to joining (Steinmacher, Graciotto
Silva, Gerosa, & Redmiles, 2015; von Krogh, Spaeth, &
Lakhani, 2003) and contributing to (Ducheneaut, 2005;
Nafus, 2011) such projects undermines any notion that
they exist outside of preexisting social disparities. Both
the GBFS and MDS projects state an expectation that
their contributions will come primarily from a partic-
ular community—representatives of affected govern-
ment agencies, mobility vendors, or third-party software
providers. Each project has a few dozen listed contribu-
tors, a small portion ofwhomdrivemost of the discussion
and development. Confirming previous studies of open-
source software development, there are clear dimen-
sions of deliberation and exclusion within these commu-
nities. The following example further illustrates how the
development of the platform’s core has implications for
subsequent implementation by platform participants.
In the spring of 2019, a GBFS contributor raised
a concern on GitHub that bike_id, a GBFS data field
uniquely identifying the bicycle, could be used to recon-
struct a trip if the ID is stable (North American Bikeshare
Association, 2019b). By scraping data from this public
feed, a nefarious actor could use bike_id to follow the
location of a given bicycle, compromising the privacy of
individual riders’ origins and destinations. Other contrib-
utors generally agreed that this vulnerability should be
fixed, and proposed a variety of technical changes to
the specification to do so. Suggestions included secur-
ing bike_id with authentication, including it only in a sep-
arate authenticated feed, requiring vendors to change
bike_id after every trip, and dropping it from the spec
entirely. In discussing the merits of these options, in
online discussion boards on GitHub (North American
Bikeshare Association, 2019b, 2019c) over nine months
and at a September 2019 conference workshop (North
American Bikeshare Association, 2019a), the developer
community revealed tensions in use cases and imple-
mentation of the specification.
For the end user, a public bike_id allows travelers
to find and reserve a bike through a mobile app. In this
use case, there is no need to know anything about the
past locations of a given bike. However, bike share ven-
dors and municipal regulators have also used bike_id
for other purposes, such as monitoring fleet utilization
or identifying ‘stale’ bikes parked too long in one place.
For these uses, a stable bike_id is helpful. Resolving the
privacy vulnerability created by a stable bike_id there-
fore also required clarifying the purpose of the specifi-
cation itself. Among the “guiding principles” of GBFS is
that it is “targeted at providing transit information to
the bikeshare end user….GBFS is about public informa-
tion” (North American Bikeshare Association, 2020). One
contributor recognized that some cities had been using
bike_id to track vendor compliance, but echoed this guid-
ing principle in arguing that “GBFS is intended to be
used for traveler-facing information…going forward pri-
vacy concerns outweigh alternate use cases like this for
GBFS that fall outside its primary purpose.” Ultimately,
the accepted solution was grounded in these guidelines
favoring the traveler, and this resolution suggested that
MDS, which is specifically targeted at municipal users,
could better support the other use cases.
A related issue in updating the specification con-
cerned the ease of implementation of any proposed
change. Since GBFS is already in wide use, any change
to the spec that is incompatible with previous versions
could require a significant investment of resources to
implement across many producers and consumers of
this data. A representative of Google Maps, for exam-
ple, explained that their integration with one vendor,
which allows users to reserve the vendor’s bikes through
Google’s app, depends on a stable bike_id. Meanwhile,
other mobility vendors said that they were already
changing bike_ids in their data feeds, thus avoiding the
originally flagged privacy vulnerability and minimizing
the impact of requiring these ID changes.
In January 2020, a vote was held among GBFS con-
tributors on GitHub to approve a proposed change to
the specification requiring vendors to change each bike’s
bike_id to a new, random ID at the end of each trip.
Seven contributors, representing both producers and
consumers of GBFS data, voted in favor, and none against.
The change has now been implemented in the latest ver-
sion of the spec.
Kate Crawford (2016), in arguing that algorithmshave
politics, has pointed out that what appears to be the
deterministic outcome of a computational process is
better described as the superficial resolution of a still-
present but obscured conflict. Here too, a technical
fix has been implemented, but the alternatives, which
might have better served certain users, simply disappear.
Compromise and exclusion are in the nature of standards,
and any software development must balance compet-
ing objectives. The city of Seattle has been proactive in
defining its policies for protecting traveler privacy, includ-
ing city data collection and handling (Seattle Department
of Transportation, 2019), yet it has no direct control
over the GBFS standard and its resulting privacy implica-
tions. Although consumers of GBFS can disagree about
the relative merits of, say, traveler privacy and ease of
data analysis for their given situation, the standardiza-
tion requirements of the platform sharply limits their
ability to engage on their own terms (Butt et al., 2016).
Instead, deliberations and prioritizations that play out
in software development forums propagate constraints
across users universally.
3.2. Participation: Use Mediated by Interfaces
The discussion of data specifications has already hinted
at limitations in platform participation. Despite being an
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open-source project, contribution to GBFS is largely lim-
ited to those with a baseline of technical knowledge and
a professional affiliation with a mobility service. Here,
however, I focus on participation not in platform pro-
duction, but in the broader sense of the platform’s use.
This participation, as in tweets and ‘likes,’ is the basis of
the empowering ‘connectedness’ celebrated by platform
proponents, but its power is regularly criticized as super-
ficial and constrained, coming at the cost of an increased
surveillance and commodification of intimate relations
(Butt et al., 2016). For platform urbanism, ‘participation’
is not primarily about posting content on the Internet,
but about a much broader scope of pervasive and mun-
dane practices of everyday interactions, such that “the
very nature of urban experience…becomes a site for plat-
form intermediation” (Barns, 2019, p. 8). Getting around
the city can in this sense be a kind of platform participa-
tion (van der Graaf& Ballon, 2019). In this view, a traveler
setting her own origin and destination on Uber is creat-
ing a program on the Uber platform, a particular exten-
sion of the platform constrained but not determined by
Uber. This section takes Lyft’s user interface as an indica-
tion of the kind of participant this platform envisions and
encourages, namely one who is a passive, individualistic
consumer of a service.
In North America, Lyft is the second-largest ride-
hailing platform, with fewer rides in fewer places than
its rival Uber, but is nonetheless a dominant player in
Seattle and most metropolitan areas. Like Uber, Lyft has
promised city officials that, despite mounting evidence
to the contrary, ride hailing platforms can reduce con-
gestion and emissions in major cities. Central to this
promise is the use of pooled rides, by which passengers
unknown to each other who have nearby origins and
destinations ride together in the same vehicle for some
portion of their trip. Through its algorithmic coordina-
tion of demand, Lyft promises to move more people in
fewer vehicles. The company set a goal in 2019 of mak-
ing “shared rides account for 50% of all trips on the Lyft
platform by the end of 2020” (Lyft, 2019a). Yet as one
state transportation secretary remarked at an industry
conference, the ride pooling algorithms are easy, but
“it is actually behavior and culture that is the part of
this that we are really having a hard time” influencing
(Pollack, 2019). That passenger behavior—choosing the
pool option within the app interface, sometimes walk-
ing a few blocks to a designated pickup location, shar-
ing a back seat with a stranger, and making detours for
additional stops—competes with a kind of participation
that is narrowly tailored to the individual passenger’s cur-
rent needs.
The app interface illustrates this personalized focus.
Upon opening, the Lyft app uses the passenger’s current
location as a default pickup point, then asks “Where are
you going?” and offers a personalized list of destinations.
Once the origin and destination have been identified,
the app shows a map highlighting the expected route,
as well as a choice of ride options, including pooled
options, which include estimated costs and arrival times
(Figure 1). Throughout the booking and travel process,
the app provides instructions and images that are specif-
ic to the rider’s particular journey—her origin, destina-
Figure 1. Screenshots from the user interface while booking a trip in the Lyft app. Source: Lyft (2019b).
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tion, route, and vehicle—but little surrounding social or
environmental context. Features like pre-populated des-
tinations, automatic payment, and real-time arrival esti-
mates, and door-to-door service are designed to mini-
mize the effort a traveler must make to move around
town on the Lyft platform.
The pool option is easy to select from available ride
options in the app interface, and Lyft even says it has
modified its interface to encourage sharing (Lyft, 2019a).
The estimated travel times, however, are typically both
longer and less precise. One finding of interviews with
the users of ride-hailing apps in Seattle was that the cost
advantage of pooled rideswas often outweighed by their
uncertainty. One subject called it a “gamble,” and said
he avoids pools if he is in a hurry. Another said he wor-
ried about sharing a ridewith drunk or unruly passengers.
These riders wanted to know when exactly they would
arrive, but also who they would need to sit with to get
there. The individual ride option, still the default choice
in the app interface, delivers an experience that is more
predictable and personalized.
In the Lyft interface, and in its use by a particular trav-
eler, we find a site of tension between Lyft’s stated cor-
porate goal of increasing shared rides and its prioritiza-
tion of rider convenience. This illustrates both the pow-
er and limitations of the platform architecture. As long
as the Lyft app presents options, the agency of its users
will preclude Lyft from fully specifying all its travel activ-
ity. This agency is a reminder that digital systems do
not exert control universally (Rose, 2017), and platforms,
as participatory systems, are inherently indeterminate
(Leszczynski, 2019a). At the same time, we can see how
the app design is indeed an active presence in the travel-
er’s decision-making. Lyft’s interface allows comparison
of the time andmonetary costs to the individual user, but
makes no mention of emissions or congestion, the met-
rics by which the benefits of carpooling accrue at the city
scale. The system’s accountability is based largely on the
ratings riders and drivers give each other, but there is no
ability for actors external to the transaction to evaluate,
say, whether a driver performed an unsafe maneuver or
a rider blocked traffic for the sake of an easier drop-off.
While we could imagine an interface that actively nudges
users towardsmore socially aware decision-making, Butt
et al. (2016, p. 737) suggest that the individualistic nature
of platform participation might be inherent to the form,
which “focuses on individual contributions to a social net-
work” with “instrumental” goals, rather than envisioning
amore collective social engagement. To participate in the
platform is to exercise an expanded agency of mobility,
but only within the confines of a structure that presup-
poses a certain set of individual goals and priorities.
3.3. Digitality: The Limits of Algorithmic Conflict
Resolution
The efficiency and reach of platforms as digital tech-
nologies is a result of their collection and manipulation
of data, and therefore requires “a radical expansion in
the forms of social interaction and transaction that can
be rendered as data” (Amoore & Piotukh, 2015, p. 345,
emphasis in the original). Yet the reach of this digitiza-
tion of everyday life is not unlimited. This section uses an
example at the leading edge of digitization efforts, one
app’s automated parking-enforcement feature, to illus-
trate how platforms struggle to manage relations that
are not easily monitored and quantified, even when they
can automatically resolve more legible conflicts.
The city of Seattle’s bike share vendor permit require-
ments document describes concern with the locations
of shared bicycles at two scales. First, the city wants the
bicycles to be available in neighborhoods across the city,
and not only in the denser or richer neighborhoods likely
to bemost lucrative to vendors. The city permit therefore
states that “the vendor shall distribute 10%ormore of its
deployed fleet in designated equity focus areas” (Seattle
Department of Transportation, 2018, p. 50), neighbor-
hoods that the Seattle Department of Transportation
has identified for priority service (see Figure 2). Riders
are allowed to complete their trips in any city neighbor-
hood, but vendors have a responsibility to ensure ade-
quate coverage at the beginning of each day, if necessary
by redistributing bicycles. At a smaller scale, the city is
also concerned with the location of parked bicycles with-
in the public right-of-way. Free-floating bicycles do not
have dedicated parking infrastructure, and so a rider can
Figure 2. Map highlighting ‘Equity focus areas’ in which
vendors must distribute 10% of their fleet. Source:
Seattle Department of Transportation (2018).
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lock and leave a bicycle anywhere upon completing a trip.
To avoid bicycles blocking sidewalks, doorways, and road
traffic, the city has specified where in the right-of-way
bike parking is permitted (see Figure 3). In this function,
the city regulation seeks to protect the interests of those
who are not users of bike share but who nonetheless
have an indirect stake in its operation. Although the rider
is responsible for proper parking, the city holds the ven-
dor accountable for parking violations.
Figure 3. A diagram of a right-of-way showing where
shared bikes should and should not be parked. Source:
Seattle Department of Transportation (2018).
Digital technologies are involved in monitoring parking
at both scales, but in very different ways. Each bicycle
is equipped with a GPS receiver and periodically reports
location data to the city usingMDS. Seattle requires loca-
tion accuracy to four decimal places in decimal degrees,
approximately 10 meters. While some vendors provide
more precise figures, reported location from these GPS
units is generally unreliable beyond a few meters. For
matching locations to neighborhoods, this spatial resolu-
tion is more than adequate. Given a dataset with the lati-
tude and longitude of all parked bicycles at a given point
in time, a city transportation official can easily calculate
the number within the defined neighborhoods. Similarly,
vendors canmonitor a bicycle’s location during a trip and
notify the rider using a phone alert when they travel in or
out of a geofenced no-parking zone (see Figure 4). A rider
can also be automatically prevented from ending a trip in
an unauthorized zone.
This location data is less helpful, however, for mon-
itoring correct parking at the scale of the sidewalk. GPS
cannot accurately differentiate between a bicycle parked
incorrectly in the center of sidewalk andoneparkedprop-
erly one meter away, nor can it indicate the orienta-
tion of the bicycle—parallel to the sidewalk, perpendic-
ular, or prone. Even with more accurate location data,
Seattle would need to compare this against geographic
data describing the right-of-way in great detail, including
all street furniture, vegetation, building frontages, and
entrances. Such high-resolution data is not available.
Figure 4. An SMS notification to a bike share rider upon
entering a geofenced no-parking zone. Source: Author.
Parking education, monitoring, and enforcement is
therefore largely managed without direct digital inter-
vention. Signage on the bicycles themselves, graphics
in the app, and instructional materials from both the
Seattle Department of Transportation and the vendors
instruct riders about proper parking, and the Seattle
Department of Transportation conducts routine street
audits of parking. However, one vendor, Lime, has sug-
gested a path to automate parking enforcement. Upon
completion of a trip, the Lime app asks the rider to
take a photo of the parked vehicle. Separately, an in-app
feature called Parked or Not (Figure 5) invites users to
view photos of parked scooters, then indicate if they are
parked correctly or not. Although Seattle does not cur-
rently permit scooters, cities that do apply similar restric-
tions on parking. In announcing the feature on its blog,
Lime called it a “fun” way for “engaged riders to take
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Figure 5. Screenshots of Lime’s Parked or Not feature. Source: Author.
an active role in educating” other riders (Lime, 2018a).
Less obvious to the user is that it is also a means of cre-
ating a scalable digital enforcement tool. The Parked or
Not lead explained that “the next step is to develop sta-
tistical models that help us identify positive and negative
behavior” (Lime, 2018a), and Lime, in its app for a Seattle
permit, mentions its work “building out and implement-
ing machine learning techniques to create an automated
system that can verify rider’s parking jobs” (Lime, 2018b).
The apparent purpose of Parked or Not, then, is to use
the human identification of images of correct and incor-
rect parking to create a training dataset that teaches an
artificial intelligence to do the same automatically and
at scale.
The details of the development and deployment of
such systems are not publicly available, and the Parked
or Not feature is no longer available on Lime’s app.
Still, a closer look at the possible mechanisms of this
feature can help to illustrate the limitations of digital
management of parking conflicts. First, the tool is of
course not entirely digital, relying on hidden labor (Irani,
2015) whose value accumulates to the platform owners
(Srnicek, 2017). Beyond these economic concerns, one
problem with the system is its assumption that prop-
er parking in a dynamic, three-dimensional urban con-
text can be accurately identified from a single image.
The standardized approach also elides any local regulato-
ry differences, since users are asked to evaluate parking
without knowing anything about the nuances of parking
guidance in the jurisdiction of the photo.
Indeed, the question of what constitutes ‘correct’
parking is largely subjective. Despite the specificity of
Seattle’s parking restrictions, they leave room for reason-
able disagreement about whether a bike accords with
the regulations, or whether those restrictions are actu-
ally appropriate for a given situation. Unobtrusive park-
ing might be less of a concern on a quieter neighbor-
hood street than on a high-traffic downtown sidewalk,
for example. The ways that we occupy shared public
spaces are inherently relational, requiring continual nego-
tiations large and small among inhabitants whose goals
sometimes collide. Lime’s automated parking monitor-
ing would presumably enforce a de facto parking stan-
dard blind to this social context. Indeed, the app effec-
tively overlooks the very people who might be best situ-
ated evaluate proper parking. In mediating relationships
among Lime, the Lime user, and the city regulator, the
app excludes the external community of those who are
directly affected by its use of public space. These interests
are represented in the platform only indirectly through
the city’s regulations, and the platform’s community is
implied to be the actual users of the bikes and scooters.
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At least two differences can help explain the gap
between the fairly straightforward digital monitoring
of neighborhood distribution and the more complex
automation of parking enforcement within the right-of-
way. One is scale. The limited resolution of both bicycle
location data and city geographic data means that the
identification of a bicycle as either inside or outside of a
desired zone is far more reliable at the scale of the neigh-
borhood than at that of a human body on a sidewalk.
A second issue is the difference between quantifiable tar-
gets and goals with amore qualitative, subjective charac-
ter. In contrast to interpreting appropriate parking, cal-
culating the percentage of bicycles available in defined
neighborhoods is a fairly objectivematter of locating and
counting. The latter is more readily quantified and digi-
tized, while the former can be digitized only clumsily, as
Parked or Not illustrates.
4. Conclusion
Digital platforms are political in the ways they monetize
participation and accumulate value (Srnicek, 2017), in
their automated reproduction and acceleration of pre-
existing relations of domination (Noble, 2018), and in
their mediation of everyday discourse and information
exchange (Gillespie, 2018). Studies of technology have
long emphasized that a given technology is a product not
only of thosewho directly create it, but also of thosewho
exercise their own agency in using it in particular ways
to meet their own needs (Kline & Pinch, 1996). However,
as platforms further blur the distinction between pro-
duction and use, these technologies become participa-
tory in new ways. This demands a greater attention to
the ways that they not only reflect and shape social
values and relations, as science and technology studies
has long argued of technology, but also how the plat-
form becomes a site of value formation and relation
building in itself. While such a framing is well estab-
lished in studies of online social media, platform urban-
ism has more recently suggested a way to understand
the digital organization of urban space as well. The exam-
ples of urban mobility technologies presented here have
focused on three characteristics of the platform—its
centralized architecture, its user participation, and its
digitality—to argue that these constitute sites in which
social relations are both enacted and ordered. These digi-
tal platformpolitics play out not just in code, but in every-
day urban spaces, where they are made apparent in trip
visibility, transportation availability, and the negotiations
of shared public space. Through these examples, this arti-
cle has pointed to a conceptualization of platformpolitics
that connects the platform’s technical organization and
the means by which actors engage with one another in
urban space.
The data specification, interface, and algorithmic tool
presented here have each illustrated the simultaneous
openness of platform participation and the confines of
platform architectures. As infrastructures, they are easi-
ly overlooked regulators of everyday behavior, while as
forums of participation, they are relational and indeter-
minate. GBFS is an open-source specificationwith accessi-
ble contributor roles and a transparent development pro-
cess. As a standard, however, it overrides local variations,
limiting the ability of cities, or indeed travelers, to con-
trol their own data. On the Lyft platform, riders canmove
through the city in ways specific to their own needs, but
this practice is constrained by an interface that presup-
poses an individualistic transaction. GPS monitoring of
shared bikes is a way of ordering the messiness of partic-
ipation on free-floating bike share platforms. This archi-
tectural control is limited, however, to practices that can
be easily digitized. In the end, the platform frustrates any
simplistic reading of its politics as inherently liberatory or
oppressive. Yet as digital technologies “scale beyond the
chambers of city halls and on to the personal networked
devices of (nearly) every urban denizen” (Leszczynski,
2019a, p. 5) and as platforms become “urbanized” (Barns,
2019), the nuanced political arrangements attending the
configurations of these digital platforms demand our
careful consideration. With such a perspective, we can
begin to see participation in the city as, in part, partici-
pation in its digital infrastructures.
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